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"The chapter describes and discusses interaction within the Norwegian
Armed Forces. Military interaction is understood as the dynamic and sometimes unpredictable
action undertaken when two or more services interact. The chapter explores
why interaction between military services, such as land, sea and air forces, is
difficult – and, in some circumstances, completely absent. How can inadequate interaction
between the military branches be explained? As Europe's armed forces become
increasingly complex and sophisticated, two perspectives from organisational theory
are applied. First, an instrumental perspective is used to comprehend the problem.
Particular attention is paid to the tension between hierarchical authority and the division
of labour. Thereafter, a cultural perspective is used to comprehend inter-service
rivalry. Here, attention is paid to informal rules and regulations, or habitual 'rules of
thumb' that have become institutionalised over time. These 'the behavioural patterns'
affect the way military services perceive themselves in contrast to others. The main
finding is that Norway's Armed Forces suffer from 'limited rationality'. This is because
Norway's military units operate within a fragmented command structure that consists
of many different sub-organisations; individually, in times of peace in Norway, they
pursue their own myopic agendas rather than a comprehensive national objective. In
this process, the branches are also forced to compromise with each other to reach their
individual objectives. A form of limited rationality therefore arises because the Army,
Navy and Air Force act rationally. This is, however, not on the basis of what serves
Norwegian security best, but on the basis of what is rational for their specific branch."

På begynnelsen av 2000-tallet ble det norske invasjonsforsvaret nedlagt. Men hvilke årsaker var viktigst for denne beslutningen? Var det økonomiske, institusjonelle eller kulturelle årsaksforhold? I denne artikkelen legges hovedvekten på institusjonelle årsaker, særlig den norske frykten for at NATO skulle bli irrelevant for USA. Dermed var det bare en ting å gjøre: å avvikle invasjonsforsvaret slik at det kunne frigjøres friske penger. For slik kunne et lite allianseavhengig land, i utkanten av Europa, utenfor EU, og med felles grense til Russland, bidra med ekspedisjonære styrker. Ikke minst for å holde liv i et NATO som strevde med å gjøre seg relevante for USA, først på Balkan og senere i Afghanistan. Med kildemateriale fra Washington D.C., Brussel og Oslo mellom 1998 og 2002 tolkes Norges politiske kontekst inn i et institusjonelt perspektiv. Forhold som resiprositet, norsk omdømme og lojalitet i NATO, blir viktig for å forstå invasjonsforsvarets endelikt.
Abstract in English:NATO's Role in Norway's Defence Reforms, 1998–2002At the turn of the new milennium, Norway's anti-invasion defence concept vanished. What was the rationale for this decision? Was it economc, institutional or cultural reasons? The findings in this article emphasise institutional perspectives. Norwegian apprehensions over a possibly irrelevant NATO in the eyes of the United States stirred a fundamental post-Cold War defence reform. To preclude a future marginalisation of NATO, decision-makers in Oslo needed to free scarce resources from a static, territorial defence that had lost its political and military relevance in the High North. By forging a smaller but more professional force, with improved deployability, survivability and usability abroad, Norway could more effectively contribute to allied cohesiveness. Not least through improved risk- and burdensharing in NATO's out-of-area operations on the Balkans and in Afghanistan. By using primary sources from Washington, DC, Brussels and Oslo between 1998 and 2002, the data is interpretated though the lense of liberal institutionalism. Explanatory mechanisms such as Norwegian reciprocity in the High North, US expectations towards dependent allies abroad, and Norway's collective solidarity may explain why the anti-invasion concept died.

Når militære styrker roterer inn og ut av operasjonsområder i tiår etter tiår, skjer det noe med beslutningstakerne. Politikere, embetsverk og offiserer sosialiseres inn nye selvbilder. Gamle normer, som at Forsvaret er et nasjonalt nødvergeinstrument byttes ut med nye selvbilder der det å krige ute blir viktig for å forstå seg selv som «en god alliert».
Abstract in EnglishReply to Karsten Friis, NUPIAs military forces rotate on a regular basis in and out of a theatre, decisionmakers become influenced. Not least by new self-perceptions. Politicians, civil servants and officers are socialized into new identities. Old norms, like territorial defence, are gradually exchanged with new expeditionary images of what it means to be "a good ally".

Siden Gulfkrigen i 1991 har skandinaviske land deltatt i nesten 30 år med sammenhengende krig, på blant annet Balkan, i Afghanistan, i Irak, Libya, Mali og Syria. Hvordan kan vi forstå denne formen for militæraktivisme? Tradisjonelle teorier fra realismen, institusjonalismen og konstruktivismen gir ingen gode svar. Innenfor organisasjonsteorien derimot, finnes det forklaringer knyttet til begrepet «strategisk kultur». Ved å utforske den strategiske kulturen i USAs militære styrker under krigene i Afghanistan, Irak og Libya trer det frem et tydelig mønster: det bombes for mye på militær side, og det snakkes for lite på diplomatisk side. I USAs doktriner levnes det lite til overs for dialog, forhandling og kompromiss. Dermed blir den strategiske kulturen innad i de militære styrkene et outrert uttrykk for en krigføringsform der operasjonene ses på som et null-sum spill. Resultatet blir oftest systemkollaps i statene som angripes. Denne kulturen har store konsekvenser for små skandinaviske allianseavhengige land: knappe forsvarsressurser trekkes inn i hengemyrerer det er vanskelig å komme ut av, ikke minst fordi koalisjonslederen selv, USA, forårsaker dem.
Abstract in English:How Should Scandinavian Military Activism Be Understand?Since the 1991 Gulf War, Scandinavian states have continuously been engaged in various international operations, i.e. on the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, Libya, Mali and Syria. How can we comprehend this peculiar form of Scandinavian military activism? Traditional theories derived from realism, institutionalism and constructivism provides few convincing explanations. Within organisational theory however, plausible explanations may be found though the concept of 'strategic culture'. By exploring the military culture prevailing inside US forces operating in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, a consistent pattern arises: too much bombing from the military side, coupled with insufficient diplomatic talks. Little effort is paid to dialogue, negotiations and compromises. US warfighting thereby becomes a one-dimensional expression of a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all. The result is a collapse inside the states that are attacked. This culture has grave consequences for small Scandinavian allies: scarce military resources are trapped into a quagmire made by the coalition leader itself, the United States.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable "buffer" between East and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm's length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe has de facto slid from "buffer" to "springboard" for US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with NATO may have accelerated Norway's role as a "springboard" for US forces. This is because cost-intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance between deterrence and restraint vis-à-vis Russia.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable "buffer" between East and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm's length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe hasde factoslid from "buffer" to "springboard" for US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with NATO may have accelerated Norway's role as a "springboard" for US forces. This is because cost-intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance between deterrence and restraintvis-à-visRussia.